Microeconomix intervenes in support of its clients and their lawyers in information exchanges and cartels allegation cases. Combining economic theoretical models with facts finding and data analysis allows evaluating the evidence of a collusive agreement. Based on the analysis of the market structure and the observed market evolutions, our work helps to identify factors facilitating the emergence and stability of collusive agreements as well as evaluating the effects of information exchanges between competitors on market outcome.

The identification of the economic model that best suits the functioning of market concerned and its comparison to the observed facts allows evaluating whether the evidence used by the competition authorities to claim the existence of a cartel is consistent with effective competition. We also confront the collusive scenarios presented by the competition authority with the empirical findings in order to rebut antitrust allegations.

We use empirical economic analyses in order to establish whether the evolution of prices in a market could have been caused by other factors than the collusive agreement. We investigate whether certain periods or groups of products were unaffected by the alleged cartel activity.

We construct rigorous reasoning supporting legal strategies and offer practical and professional advice in a non-technical manner understandable to a non-economic audience. We help in evaluating the gravity of the infringement and to evaluate the effects of the alleged collusive behavior on prices and product quality and choice.

The state-of-the-art economic analysis combined with conduct detailed market research and/or econometric modeling provides tools to construct robust but-for scenarios and to evaluate the damages to the economy and the individual or collective prejudices suffered by the parties involved. We estimate sales, prices and profits that would have been if the collusive behavior had not taken place and compare it with the actual outcome. Based on those estimates, we evaluate damages inflicted on customers or suppliers.

Microeconomix has a sound experience in cartel allegations cases to provide a wide base of expertise to former article 81 (101 TFEU) litigations. We have advised clients in many industries, including telecommunications, perfumery, plywood products and oil.

Examples of our work include:

• 2008-2009 - Microeconomix advised Plysorol in the appeal against the decision of the French Conseil de la concurrence regarding coordinated price increases in the plywood sector (Decision No.08-D-12 of 21 Mai 2008).
• 2005-2009 - Microeconomix advised Orange France in the litigation of cartel activities and information exchange in the market for mobile phones before the French Conseil de la concurrence and later the Court of Appeal (Decision No.05-D-65 of 30 Nov 2005).
• 2008 - Microeconomix advised Total Réunion in the litigation before the French Conseil de la concurrence regarding information exchange and market sharing (Decision No.08-D-30 of 4 Dec 2008).
• 2007 - Microeconomix advised four members of group LVMH (Parfums Christian Dior, Givenchy, Kenzo Parfums et Guerlain) in the appeal against the decision of the French Conseil de la concurrence regarding vertical restraints between producers and distributors of perfumes and luxury cosmetics (Decision No.06-D-04 of 13 Mars 2006).
• 2007 - Microeconomix advised Villeroy & Boch in a procedure before European Commission regarding cartel activities. Microeconomix testified in front of the case team.
• 2003 - Microeconomix advised Shell in the litigation before the French Conseil de la concurrence (Decision No.03-D-17 of 31 mars 2003).
• 2003 - Following the request of Atofina, Microeconomix conducted an evaluation of economic consequences of cartel activities (analyze of the evolution of prices and profitability ratios) in the chemical industry in the period 1971-2002 (Decision of the European Commission No. C(2003)4570 of 10 Dec 2003).